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• the value of, and obstacles to, reflective practice
  Sebastian Kraemer
  Published on: 29 August 2018
• The value of accepting good with bad in moral distress: a response to Benjamin Hickox
  Trisha M Prentice, Lynn Gillam, Peter G Davis and Annie Janvier
  Published on: 26 January 2018
• Moral distress is always a burden. Moral stress is not. The importance of a priori conceptual clarity.
  Benjamin C Hickox
  Published on: 6 October 2017

• Published on: 29 August 2018

  the value of, and obstacles to, reflective practice

  • Sebastian Kraemer, health staff group consultant (retired paediatric psychiatrist) Tavistock & Portman NHS Trust

  Moral distress is a good 'umbrella' term but it tends to invite diversionary philosophising when in truth we all know that work in intensive care puts enormous emotional pressures on staff. These can be attended to but as the paper shows, cannot be eradicated. Health care is not a mechanical process. As one of the subjects in this study said "if we removed moral distress we would be like robots" (F443).

  In my response to an earlier paper on this theme by the same authors https://adc.bmj.com/content/101/8/701.responses I discussed the benefits and limitations of facilitated discussions. One of the most striking comments from a neonatal intensive care nurse in one such meeting was "if you don't talk about it you don't know it's bad" http://bit.ly/1OyKcfl which perfectly captures our essential ambivalence about looking at troubling experiences in any depth. We are after all practitioners, and the tradition of 'getting on with it' - with occasional intelligent and practical thoughts on process - is the prevailing culture in most health services. Yet after almost 40 years as a psychiatrist in paediatric settings I know that there is a hunger for less systematic, but no less disciplined, attention to the daily experience of health work. This short paper 'stop running and start thinking' (Kraemer 2019...

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  Moral distress is a good 'umbrella' term but it tends to invite diversionary philosophising when in truth we all know that work in intensive care puts enormous emotional pressures on staff. These can be attended to but as the paper shows, cannot be eradicated. Health care is not a mechanical process. As one of the subjects in this study said "if we removed moral distress we would be like robots" (F443).

  In my response to an earlier paper on this theme by the same authors https://adc.bmj.com/content/101/8/701.responses I discussed the benefits and limitations of facilitated discussions. One of the most striking comments from a neonatal intensive care nurse in one such meeting was "if you don't talk about it you don't know it's bad" http://bit.ly/1OyKcfl which perfectly captures our essential ambivalence about looking at troubling experiences in any depth. We are after all practitioners, and the tradition of 'getting on with it' - with occasional intelligent and practical thoughts on process - is the prevailing culture in most health services. Yet after almost 40 years as a psychiatrist in paediatric settings I know that there is a hunger for less systematic, but no less disciplined, attention to the daily experience of health work. This short paper 'stop running and start thinking' (Kraemer 2019 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/camh.12282 ) summarises a parallel but subjugated tradition of respecting the curiosity and courage of front line workers which I hope can gain greater prominence in future.

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  Conflict of Interest:
  None declared.

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• Published on: 26 January 2018

  The value of accepting good with bad in moral distress: a response to Benjamin Hickox

  • Trisha M Prentice, Neonatologist The Royal Women's Hospital, Melbourne
  • Other Contributors:
    • Lynn Gillam, n/a
    • Peter G Davis, n/a
    • Annie Janvier, n/a

  We agree that conceptual clarity is of great value. Furthermore we acknowledge that some ‘distress’ experienced by our clinicians was not of a moral nature – such as the distress that results from tragic circumstances. We believe that in practice, distress and moral distress overlap. It can be difficult for clinicians to isolate the precise aetiology of their distress. We have furthermore acknowledged that these factors mean that the frequency of ‘moral distress’ may be overestimated in this study. However we are unclear why the ‘distress’ experienced by our clinicians is better labelled as ‘moral stress’. We maintain that conceptual clarity must be of clinical significance and be meaningful to those experiencing it. The clinicians participating were not uncomfortable with the idea that good things could arise from ‘distressing’ situations. It seems a disservice to the healthcare professionals in our study experiencing it to relabel it as ‘stress’ rather than ‘distress’ for the purpose of a less unsettling conclusion. We assume that Mr Hickox remains sceptical that moral distress, as strictly defined (that is, where a clinician feels anguish due to being constrained from acting in accordance with his/her moral judgement), may have some positive attributes. We will outline why we believe that in addition to decreasing moral distress and it’s negative consequences, we – and...

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  We agree that conceptual clarity is of great value. Furthermore we acknowledge that some ‘distress’ experienced by our clinicians was not of a moral nature – such as the distress that results from tragic circumstances. We believe that in practice, distress and moral distress overlap. It can be difficult for clinicians to isolate the precise aetiology of their distress. We have furthermore acknowledged that these factors mean that the frequency of ‘moral distress’ may be overestimated in this study. However we are unclear why the ‘distress’ experienced by our clinicians is better labelled as ‘moral stress’. We maintain that conceptual clarity must be of clinical significance and be meaningful to those experiencing it. The clinicians participating were not uncomfortable with the idea that good things could arise from ‘distressing’ situations. It seems a disservice to the healthcare professionals in our study experiencing it to relabel it as ‘stress’ rather than ‘distress’ for the purpose of a less unsettling conclusion. We assume that Mr Hickox remains sceptical that moral distress, as strictly defined (that is, where a clinician feels anguish due to being constrained from acting in accordance with his/her moral judgement), may have some positive attributes. We will outline why we believe that in addition to decreasing moral distress and it’s negative consequences, we – and many of our research participants – also think moral distress may not always be avoidable nor negative.

  Disproportionate or aggressive medical treatments considered not in a patient’s best interests are commonly cited as key causes of moral distress(Prentice, Janvier et al. 2016). This may occur when there is disagreement between the treating team and the family, due to differently held beliefs and values. Though principles of harm draw some guidance around the role of parents in decision-making, many of these cases still fall within the broad ‘zone of parental discretion’(Gillam 2016, McDougall, Gillam et al. 2016). If we accept that parents have a significant role in decision-making and are ethically permitted to choose options for their child that are not (in our opinion) ideal, then a degree of moral distress is ‘inevitable’. This inevitability stems from differences in subjective beliefs and values and does not necessarily reflect an organisational failing as Epstein suggests(Epstein and Hurst 2017). The experience of moral distress in these situations – in accordance with standard definitions– can be traumatic and we do not mean to downplay this in any way. Yet as Dudinski notes “[m]oral intuitions should not be ignored, nor are they definitive. They must bear the weight of ethical scrutiny”(Dudzinski 2016). If we do not accept that moral distress can lead to constructive discussions, patient advocacy and a mechanism for progressive thought then we are left with moral distress acting as a vehicle for blame(Dudzinski 2016), often inferring that the clinical lead either is failing to listen to the concerns of others or lacks the moral courage to change the current management plan(Prentice 2017). Both of these may be unfair assumptions amidst the complex end-of-life considerations and decision-making dynamics. More worrisome is that the net effect may be to place undue pressure on the family to acquiesce to a particular treatment plan to resolve the net moral distress of the treating team – what we have elsewhere referred to as ‘moral transference’(Prentice, Gillam et al. 2017). The moral distress experienced by families is too often neglected in such conversations.

  Moral distress is a burden, but it can also be something from which we can grow and learn, and our patients can benefit from. Should we not therefore be willing to accept some of its positive attributes along with all the bad? Is it fair for our patients’ families to bear the burden if we cannot?

  Dudzinski, D. M. (2016). "Navigating moral distress using the moral distress map." Journal of Medical Ethics 42(5): 321-324.
  Epstein, E. and A. Hurst (2017). "Looking at the Positive Side of Moral Distress: Why It's a Problem." Journal of Clinical Ethics 28(1): 37-41.
  Gillam, L. (2016). "The zone of parental discretion: An ethical tool for dealing with disagreement between parents and doctors about medical treatment for a child." Clinical Ethics 11(1): 1-8.
  McDougall, R., L. Gillam and H. Gold (2016). The zone of parental discretion. When Doctors and Parents Disagree. R. McDougall, C. Delany and L. Gillam, The Federation Press: 17.
  Prentice, T. (2017). Accepting the Good with the Bad when Living with Moral Distress. AAP Section on Bioethics, American Academy of Pediatrics.
  Prentice, T., A. Janvier, L. Gillam and P. G. Davis (2016). "Moral distress within neonatal and paediatric intensive care units: a systematic review." Archives of Disease in Childhood 101(8): 701-708.
  Prentice, T. M., L. Gillam, P. G. Davis and A. Janvier (2017). "The use and misuse of moral distress in neonatology." Seminars in Fetal and Neonatal Medicine.

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  Conflict of Interest:
  None declared.

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• Published on: 6 October 2017

  Moral distress is always a burden. Moral stress is not. The importance of a priori conceptual clarity.

  • Benjamin C Hickox, Registered Nurse Mayo Clinic - Rochester

  It is a deleterious proposition to declare benefits to moral distress. In their recent response, Epstein and Hurst (2017) eloquently articulated many reasons for this. A better approach may be to invoke the work of Hans Selye (1974) and the parallels drawn by Rambur, Vallett, Cohen, and Tarule (2010) in advocating for the potential benefits of moral stress; not moral distress. The authors of the present article effectively revealed clinicians' general misunderstanding and misapplication of the concept of moral distress. Indeed, the authors acknowledged this explicitly: "This study demonstrates the importance of asking what clinical providers mean by 'moral distress' and/or what researchers mean when investigating this phenomenon" (p. F4). The authors' conclusions about frequency of moral distress and "inevitability" of moral distress are based on clinician self-report; not on a generally accepted definition of moral distress. Likewise, the authors do not use a validated, reliable tool to quantify moral distress (such as the Moral Distress Thermometer, Wocial & Weaver, 2013). Much qualitative research has been done that has clarified the concept of moral distress; it is not simply whatever the clinician says it is. As ethicist Denise Dudzinski (2016) stated, "clinicians benefit by distinguishing between distress and moral distress" and "without mapping the ethical dimensions of distress, clinicians are left...

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  It is a deleterious proposition to declare benefits to moral distress. In their recent response, Epstein and Hurst (2017) eloquently articulated many reasons for this. A better approach may be to invoke the work of Hans Selye (1974) and the parallels drawn by Rambur, Vallett, Cohen, and Tarule (2010) in advocating for the potential benefits of moral stress; not moral distress. The authors of the present article effectively revealed clinicians' general misunderstanding and misapplication of the concept of moral distress. Indeed, the authors acknowledged this explicitly: "This study demonstrates the importance of asking what clinical providers mean by 'moral distress' and/or what researchers mean when investigating this phenomenon" (p. F4). The authors' conclusions about frequency of moral distress and "inevitability" of moral distress are based on clinician self-report; not on a generally accepted definition of moral distress. Likewise, the authors do not use a validated, reliable tool to quantify moral distress (such as the Moral Distress Thermometer, Wocial & Weaver, 2013). Much qualitative research has been done that has clarified the concept of moral distress; it is not simply whatever the clinician says it is. As ethicist Denise Dudzinski (2016) stated, "clinicians benefit by distinguishing between distress and moral distress" and "without mapping the ethical dimensions of distress, clinicians are left with gnawing, nebulous distress without adequate ways to root out and rectify its causes" (p. 324). So before moral distress is declared as beneficial and inevitable, a clear definition of the concept must be set forth and adhered to.

  Dudzinski, D. M. (2016). Navigating moral distress using the moral distress map. Journal of Medical Ethics, 42(5), 321-324. doi:10.1136/medethics-2015-103156

  Epstein, E. G. & Hurst, A. R. (2017). Looking at the Positive Side of Moral Distress: Why It's a Problem. Journal of Clinical Ethics, 28(1), 37-41.

  Rambur, B., Vallett, C., Cohen, J. A., & Tarule, J. (2010). The moral cascade: Distress, eustress, and the virtuous organization. Journal of Organizational Moral Psychology, 1(1), 41-54.

  Selye, H. (1974). Stress without distress. Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, Williams, and Wilkins.

  Wocial, L. D., & Weaver, M. T. (2013). Development and psychometric testing of a new tool for detecting moral distress: the Moral Distress Thermometer. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 69(1), 167-174. doi:10.1111/j.1365-2648.2012.06036.x

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  Conflict of Interest:
  None declared.

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